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Abstract—Establishing secret common randomness between
two or multiple devices in a network resides at the root of
communication security. The problem is traditionally decomposed
into a randomness generation stage (randomness purity is subject
to employing often costly true random number generators) and
a key-agreement information exchange stage, which can rely on
public-key infrastructure or on key wrapping. In this paper, we
propose KERMAN, an alternative key establishment algorithm
for ad-hoc networks which works by harvesting randomness
directly from the network routing metadata, thus achieving
both pure randomness generation and (implicitly) secret-key
agreement. Our algorithm relies on the route discovery phase
of an ad-hoc network employing the Dynamic Source Routing
protocol, is lightweight, and requires minimal communication
overhead.
Keywords—Ad hoc mesh network, Dynamic source routing,
Common randomness, Secret key establishment, Minimum entropy
I. INTRODUCTION
Automatic key establishment between two devices in a
network is generally performed either by public-key-based
algorithms (like Diffie-Hellman [1]), or by encrypting the
newly-generated key with a special key-wrapping key [2].
However, in addition to the well-established, well-investigated
keying information exchange, one additional aspect of key
establishment is often understated: to ensure the security of
the application it serves, the newly generated secret key has
to be truly random. While minimum standards for software-
based randomness quality are generally being enforced [3],
many applications rely on often costly hardware-based true
random generators [4]. Sources of randomness employed by
true random number generators vary from wireless receivers
and simple resistors to ring oscillators and SRAM memory.
In this paper, we build upon the observation that a readily-
available source of randomness is usually neglected: the net-
work dynamics. Indeed, by their very nature, networks are
This material is based upon work supported in part by the National Science
Foundation under Grant No. 1320351.
dynamic and largely unpredictable. Their randomness is usu-
ally evident in easily-accessible networking metadata such as
traffic loads, packet delays or dropped-packet rates. However,
as the main focus of our work is on mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANETs), the source of randomness we shall discuss in this
paper is one that is specific to infrastructure-less networks:
the routing information itself. Another interesting feature of
the routing information, in addition to its randomness, is that
it can easily be made available to the devices that took part
in the routing process, but it is usually unavailable to those
devices that were not part of the route. This idea opens the door
to a whole new class of applications: with the proper routing
protocol, the routing information could be used for establishing
secret common randomness between any two devices in a
mobile ad-hoc network. This common randomness could then
be further processed into true common randomness, and used
as secret keys.
Common randomness was pioneered in [5], [6], [7], where
it is shown that if two parties, Alice and Bob, have access to
two correlated random variables (RVs) X ′ and Y ′ respectively,
(in either the source or the channel models), a secret key
can be established between them through public discussions
and random-binning-like (e.g. hashing) operations. The key
should remain secret from an adversary eavesdropper (Eve)
who overhears the public discussions, and possesses side
information (in the form of a third RV Z) correlated with that
available at Alice and Bob. Common-randomness-based key
establishment generally consists of three phases. First, Alice
and Bob have to agree on two other RVs X and Y , such
that H(X|Y ) < H(X|Z) and H(Y |X) < H(Y |Z), where
H(·) is the standard Shannon entropy. This part is sometimes
called advantage distillation. Next, Alice and Bob (and also
Eve) sample their respective random variables a large number
of times, producing sequences of values. Then Alice and Bob
exchange further messages (over a public channel) to agree
on the same single sequence of values – this phase is the
information reconciliation. Finally, because the agreed-upon
sequence is not completely unknown to Eve (Eve can sample
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her variable Z synchronously with Alice and Bob), Alice and
Bob run a randomness extractor on it, to produce a secret key (a
shorter sequence) which, from Eve’s perspective, is uniformly
distributed over its space – this is the privacy amplification
phase. The ideas of [5], [6] have been recently applied to secret
key generation in wireless systems, where secure common
randomness is attained by exploiting reciprocal properties of
wireless channels or other auxiliary random sources in the
physical layer [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16].
One noteworthy observation is that, while the work of [5], [6],
[7] considers an information-theoretic approach, in practice
Alice and Bob do not usually have access to large numbers of
values drawn from their random variables, but rather to only
one or a few values. To address this issue, [17] shows that for
such single-shot scenarios, the smooth minimum entropy gives
a tight upper bound on the achievable size of the secret key.
In MANETs, the lack of infrastructure, the nodes’ mobility
and the fact that packets are routed by nodes, instead of
fixed devices, have resulted in the need for specialized routing
protocols, like the ad-hoc on-demand distance vector AODV
routing, or the dynamic source routing (DSR) [18]. For our
secret-common-randomness-extraction purposes, DSR appears
to be the ideal candidate, and will be the object of this paper.
DSR contains two main mechanisms – Route Discovery and
Route Maintenance – which work together to establish and
maintain routes from senders to receivers. The protocol works
with the use of explicit source routing, which means that the
ordered list of nodes through which a packet will pass is
included in the packet header. It is sets of these routing lists
that we shall show how to process into secret keys shared
between pairs of nodes.
Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
1) We show that the randomness inherent in an ad-hoc
network can be harvested and used for establishing
secret keys between pairs of nodes that participate in
the routing process.
2) We provide a very practical algorithm for establishing
such secret common randomness, based on the DSR
protocol, and we demonstrate a way to calculate an
achievable number of shared secret bits, using an
adversary’s beliefs.
3) We simulate a realistic ad-hoc network in OPNET
Modeler, and show that within only ten minutes, thou-
sands of secret bits can be shared between different
node pairs.
4) We discuss methods to optimize the DSR-based key
establishment process between two nodes – using the
spoiling knowledge technique and implementing an
optimized set partition algorithm.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Those
Fig. 1: Communication among node 1 and 5
parts of the DSR protocol that are essential for understanding
our algorithm are examined in Section II. In Section III, we
describe the system model and state our assumptions. Section
IV describes our proposed key establishment algorithm. Simu-
lation results obtained with OPNET Modeler are presented and
discussed in Section V, while Section VI draws conclusions
and discusses future work.
II. DYNAMIC SOURCE ROUTING
Dynamic source routing (DSR) [18] is one of the well-
established routing algorithms for ad-hoc networks. Under this
protocol, when a user (the sender) decides to send a data packet
to a destination, the sender must insert the source route in a
special position of the packet’s header, called the DSR source
route option. The source route is an ordered list of nodes that
will help relay the packet from its source to its destination.
The sender transmits the packet to the first node in the source
route. If a node receives a packet for which it is not the final
destination, the node will transmit the packet to the next hop
indicated by the source route, and this process will continue
until the packet reaches its destination.
To obtain a suitable source route toward the destination, a
sender first searches its own route cache. The route cache is
updated every time a node learns a new valid path through the
network (whether or not the node is the source or the desti-
nation for that path). If no route is found after searching the
route cache, the sender initiates the route discovery protocol.
During the route discovery, the source and destination become
the initiator and target, respectively.
As a concrete example, suppose node 1 in figure 1 wants to
send packets to node 5. Initially, node 1 does not have any route
toward node 5, and thus node 1 initiates a route discovery by
transmitting a single special local broadcast packet called route
request. The route request option is inserted in the packet’s
header, following the IP header. To send the route request, the
source address of the IP header must be set to the address of
the initiator (node 1), while the destination address of IP header
must be set to the IP limited broadcast address. These fields
must not be changed by the intermediate nodes processing the
route request. A node initiating a new route request generates
a new identification value for the route request, and places it
in the ID field of the route request header. The route request
header also contains the address of the initiator and that of the
target. The route request ID is meant to differentiate between
different requests with the same initiator and target – it should
be noted here that the same request may reach an intermediate
or destination node twice, over different paths. Each route
request header also contains a record listing the address of
each intermediate node through which this particular copy of
the route request has been forwarded. In our example, the route
record initially lists only the address of the initiator node 1. As
the packet reaches node 2, this node inserts its own address in
the packet’s route record, and broadcasts it further, and so on,
until the packet reaches the target node 5, at which point its
route record contains a valid route (1-2-3-4-5) for transmitting
data from node 1 to node 5.
As a general rule, recent route requests received at a node
should be recorded in the node’s route request table – the
sufficient information for identifying each request is the tuple
(initiator address, target address, route request ID). When a
node receives a route request packet, several scenarios can
occur. First, if the node has recently seen another route request
message from this initiator, carrying the same id and target
address, or if this nodes own address already exists in the route
record section of the route request packet, this node discards
the route request. Second, if the route request is new, and if the
node is the target, it sends a route reply packet to the initiator,
and saves a copy of the route (extracted from the route request
route record) in a table called the route cache. Third, if the
request is new, but the node is not the target, the node inserts
its address in the packet’s route record, and broadcasts the
modified packet.
In our example in figure 1, node 5 constructs a route reply
packet and transmits it to the initiator of the route request
(node 1). The source address of the IP header of the route
reply packet is set to the IP address of sender of route reply
(node 5). In our example, node 5 is also the target. But this
need not occur. Under the DSR protocol, it is possible that an
intermediate node (who is not the target of the route request)
already has a path to the target in its route cache. Then it is this
node that transmits the route reply back to the initiator, and
it is its IP address that gets inserted in the source IP address
part of the route reply packet’s header. The route reply packet
header also contains a route record. This route record starts
with the address of the first hop after the initiator and ends
with the address of the target node (regardless of whether the
node that issues the route reply is the target or not). In our
example, the route record contained in the route reply packet
is (2, 3, 4, 5). Including the address of the initiator node 1 in
the route record would be redundant, as the address of node 1
is already included as the destination address in the IP header
of the route reply packet. The combination of the route record
and destination address in the IP header is the source route
which the initiator will use for reaching its target. It is also
noteworthy that network routes are not always bidirectional.
That is, it may not always be possible for node 5 to send
its route reply to node 1 using a route obtained by simply
inverting the source route. In the more general case, node 5
has to search its own route cache for a route back to node 1.
If no such path is found, node 5 should perform its own route
discovery for finding a source route to node 1.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Mobile ad-hoc networks (MANETs) consist of mobile
nodes communicating wirelessly with each other, without
any pre-existing infrastructure. We consider a bidirectional
MANET employing dynamic source routing (DSR), in which
the nodes (corresponding to the mobile devices of the net-
work’s users) are moving in a random fashion in a pre-
defined area. The bidirectional network assumption is usually
a practical one, especially when all the nodes in the network
belong to the same class of devices (e.g. smart phones)1.
According to the route discovery protocol outlined in
section II, every single node in the network is assumed equally
likely to be the initiator of a route request packet, at any
given time. Furthermore, we assume that the target of any
route request is uniformly distributed among the remaining
nodes. Any route discovery instance will return a path through
the network (the source route), of a given length. The length
of a returned path is distributed according to a probability
distribution that depends on all the parameters of the network.
Deriving a model for this probability distribution, based on
the network parameters, is outside the scope of this work.
Hence, in the remainder of this paper, we shall assume that all
nodes have access to such an (empirically-derived) probability
distribution over the path lengths. That is, if we denote the
random variable describing the length of some path r by Lr,
then we assume that all the nodes have access to the prior
p(Lr = l), for l = 2, 3, . . .. For our experiments, we run our
simulation for a long time, and derive p(Lr = l) by counting
the paths of equal length. We also assume that all paths of
the same length are equally probable. To express this notion,
denote the random variable that samples a path (or a partial
path) by R. Then we can write p(R = r|Lr = l) = 1Nl if
the length of path r is l (otherwise the probability is zero),
where Nl is the total number of paths of length l. This leads
to p(R = r) = 1Nlr p(Lr = lr), where lr is the actual length
of path r.
Our protocol, called KERMAN runs by making each node
collect in a table all the source routes that it is part of –
1It should be noted that our algorithm should work (albeit with some
reduction in performance) even if the network is not bidirectional. In this
case, the route request ID needs to be inserted in the route reply packet.
The reduction in performance for this scenario follows from the security
considerations – namely, more nodes are involved in the routing mechanism,
and hence have access to the source route.
recall that since the network is assumed to be bidirectional,
a node can extract the route request ID, the initiator and the
target from the route request packet, save them in a temporary
table, and then, if a route reply packet carrying a source route
with the same initiator and target is observed within a pre-
determined time interval, the node can associate the source
route with the route request ID, and save both in a long-term
table.
This mechanism brings about our security model. Since
the common randomness established between two nodes by
our algorithm consists of the source routes, it should be clear
that several other nodes can be privy to this information. For
instance, all the nodes included in a particular source route
have full knowledge of this route. Moreover, it is likely that
the route reply packet carrying a source route can be overheard
by malicious eavesdroppers that are not part of the source route
at all. Therefore, to achieve a level of security, two nodes will
have to gather a large collection of source routes, such that
none of the other nodes that appear in any of the source routes
in this collection has access to all the routes in the collection.
Unfortunately this is not enough, because it is still possible
that one of the nodes, most likely a node that is part of many
– though not all – routes in the collection, eavesdropped on
all the remaining routes that it is not part of.
We deal with this problem by making an additional as-
sumption: we assume that any two source routes are exchanged
under independent and uniformly distributed network arrange-
ments. That is, for the exchange (route discovery) of each
source route, all the nodes in the network are distributed
uniformly, and independently of other exchanges, in their pre-
defined area. Moreover, the network remains the same for
the entire duration of the route discovery and the associated
data transmission. These assumptions are appropriate when the
network nodes move around fast relative to the time between
two different route discovery phases, but slow relative to the
duration of a single communication session. This means that
for any source route, the probability that any node which is not
itself part of the route overhears the route (by overhearing a
route reply or a data packet) is only a function of the network
parameters. In the remainder of this section, we show how
to compute the probability that an eavesdropper Eve knows a
source route of which it is not part.
Denote the binary random variable encoding whether an
eavesdropper Eve overhears a source route r by KEve(r).
Then p(KEve(r) = 1) depends on: (a) Eve’s reception radius,
(b) the total area of the network (all the places where Eve
could be during the communication session corresponding to
source route r), and (c) the length of the path. The computation
is described in figure 2, where it can be observed that the
worst-case scenario for a path of length l is when all the l
Fig. 2: The area covered by l nodes
Fig. 3: Example for proposed algorithm
nodes are arranged in a straight line. In this case, we can
use the following worst-case approximation (obtained by first
calculating the area of a circular segment):
p(KEve(r) = 1|Lr = l) =
=
lpid2e − 2(l − 1)d2e(pi3 −
√
3
4 )
Stotal
=
d2e(1.91 · l + 1.23)
Stotal
, (1)
where de is the maximum eavesdropping range (the radius of
the circles in figure 2), which is assumed the same for each
of the nodes (all nodes transmit with the same power, using
isotropic antennas), and Stotal is the total area of the pre-
defined location where the nodes can move.
Finally, two additional assumptions are made: the attackers
are purely passive eavesdroppers (as attackers – otherwise, they
are allowed to initiate well-behaved communication, just like
any other node), and they do not collude.
IV. PROPOSED ALGORITHM
In this section we introduce KERMAN, a Key-
Establishment algorithm based on Randomness harvested from
the source routes in a MANET employing the DSR algorithm.
To establish secret common randomness between two nodes in
the MANET, KERMAN uses the standard sequence of three
steps outlined in Section I: advantage distillation, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification.
A. Advantage Distillation
To accomplish advantage distillation, every node in the
network has to maintain a new table called the Selected Route
Table, or SRT. The SRT contains source routes that include
that node’s address. To demonstrate how the SRT is built, we
consider the following example. Take the scenario in figure 3,
in which node 1 and 6 are the source and the destination,
respectively. Since node 1 does not have any route to node
6, it generates and broadcasts a route request packet. Assume
that the id of this packet is 14, which means that this is the
fourteenth attempt that node 1 makes to reach node 6. As seen
in figure 3, node 5 will generate the route reply from its own
route cache (because we assumed that node 5 already knows
how to reach node 6). The transmission path of the route reply
from node 5 to node 1 has been illustrated in figure 3, and
is consistent with a bidirectional network. Each intermediate
node that receives this route reply inserts the source route
in their own SRT. The SRT has three columns dubbed RID,
partial route and full route respectively. RID is a tuple that
consists (Source IP, Destination IP, route request ID, route-
reply-sender IP). In our scenario, nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 will
all record an entry in their respective SRTs, with the RID 1-
6-14-5. The intermediate nodes (2, 3 and 4) can obtain the
route request ID by searching their own route request tables
as discussed in Section II. The partial route field of the SRT
entry identifies those other nodes that are supposed to have
this particular route in their SRT – in this case, nodes 1,
2, 3, 4 and 5. The full route field is the entire route from
source to destination, which will be used for data transmission
(1,2,3,4,5,6 in this case). The SRTs of the nodes 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5 have the same following entry:
RID Partial Route Full Route
1-6-14-5 1-2-3-4-5 1-2-3-4-5-6
It should be noted that, because node 6 did not directly hear
the route request from node 1, it has no way of determining
the route request ID in the RID, and this is why it cannot
store this entry in its SRT, although it will most likely learn
the source route from the received data packets that follow
the route discovery phase. Regardless, when discussing the
security of the established secret common randomness, node
6 will be assumed to have full knowledge of the full route.
Each full route in a nodes’ SRT is only available to a
limited number of nodes in the network, i.e., those nodes
which are included in in the source (full) route, along with
some nodes who are not part of the source route but happen
to overhear the route request and route reply exchange. The
following proposition states that SRT entries are unique in the
whole network.
Proposition 1: If two nodes have the same RID in their
own SRTs, then the full routes associated with this RID in
two SRTs are exactly the same.
Proof: Based on the DSR protocol [18], in the phase
of processing a received route request, several steps must
be performed in a well-defined order. The step consisting
of the search in the route request table is done before the
phase of sending route reply from the route cache. But if,
while searching the route request table, a node finds that it
has received this route request before, the node must discard
the route request packet. Hence, an intermediate node can
initiate the route reply only in response to the first route
request, and will ignore all subsequent route requests with the
same ID, source and destination. Therefore, it is not possible
that multiple route replies originate from the same node in
response to the same route request, even if the route request
was received multiple times, via different paths. Now, although
two different route replies in response to the same route request
can originate at different nodes, (for example, in figure 3 node
7 also knows a path to node 6 and initiates a route reply), the
RIDs corresponding to these route replies contain the IP of the
route reply sender, and hence are different.
B. Information Reconciliation
Information reconciliation is usually a complex process,
involving techniques from channel or source coding, and
displaying very restrictive lower bounds on the amount of
information that needs to be transmitted over a public channel
[17] – these bounds can often leave very little uncertainty
for an eavesdropper. Fortunately, KERMAN is particularly
well-suited for information reconciliation, and only requires
minimal communication overhead.
Let us assume that two nodes –call them Alice and Bob
for simplicity – realize that they share a large number of
routes in their SRTs. For instance, Alice could first notice
that Bob is part of a large number of partial routes in her
SRT, and could ask Bob to perform information reconciliation,
with the purpose of eventually generating a shared secret key.
Upon Bob’s acceptance, Alice sends him the list of RIDs
corresponding to the partial routes in Alice’s SRT that include
the address of Bob. Bob can then verify whether he already
has the received RIDs in his SRT, and can send back to Alice
only those RIDs that he could not locate. The information
reconciliation is now complete. Alice and Bob share a set of
full routes, which constitute their common randomness.
There is but one caveat. As mentioned in Section IV-A,
the RIDs consist of the tuples (Source IP, Destination IP, route
request ID, route-reply-sender IP) corresponding to each route
request/ route reply pair. Moreover, it is possible that Alice
and Bob are neither the source nor the destination, nor the
route-reply sender. Thus, transmitting an RID in the clear,
over a public channel, may expose up to five nodes of the
route (source, destination, route-reply sender, Alice and Bob)
to an eavesdropping adversary. While this does not prevent
KERMAN from working, many of the full routes of length less
than six would become useless for our purposes. An alternative
option is to only transmit a (non-keyed) hash of each RID. If
the hash is pre-image resistant, and in addition its output is
short (although long enough to ensure that no collision takes
place for those entries in Bob’s SRT which contain Alice’s
address in the full route field), the information leaked to an
adversary Eve would be much less than that leaked from the
entire RID.
The following simplifying assumptions make the treatment
in the current version of this paper more tractable, without
restricting the applicability of our results. Removing the as-
sumptions is a straightforward extension, but requires further
discussion of random hash functions (i) and a sophisticated
probabilistic argument (ii). (i) We assume that, when trans-
mitting the RIDs from Alice to Bob, no information leaks
about the contents of the RIDs, except the addresses of Alice
and Bob. (ii) We assume that every node in the network can
see that Alice and Bob exchange RIDs and has access to the
information allowed in (i).
C. Privacy Amplification
For the purposes of this section we shall represent the full
routes as sets of node identifiers, or addresses. Alice and Bob
share a list of common full routes. Now Alice and Bob can
construct the set M = {m1,m2, . . . ,mh} where mi (we’ll
call it a trimmed route) is produced from the full route ri, by
removing the addresses of Alice and Bob. At this point, full
routes and trimmed routes are in a one-to-one correspondence.
However, for following the remainder of this section, it is
essential that the reader remembers the difference between a
full route and a trimmed route.
In the next step, Alice partitions the set of trimmed routes
M into several disjoint subsets Mk ⊂ mathcalM of various
sizes hk, such that, for any Mk = {m1,k,m2,k, . . . ,mhk,k},
the probability that any node in the network has knowledge
of all the hk trimmed routes is less than a small security
parameter 1. This means that, with probability larger than
1 − 1, there exists at least one trimmed route in H that Eve
knows nothing about – note that this is true for any identity
that Eve may take (except, of course Eve cannot be Alice
or Bob). It is the full route corresponding to this trimmed
route (different from any node’s perspective) that constitutes
the randomness of the generated secret.
To extract a secret from each of the sets Mk, Alice first
represents all the full routes by pre-determined binary strings
of the same length. The length of the strings is determined
as the logarithm to base two of the total number of possible
full routes, in a practical scenario. For example, from our
simulations, we noticed that full routes are limited to 15
nodes, which means that trimmed routes are limited to 13
nodes. In a network of 50 nodes, there are thus
(
48
1
)
3! +(
48
2
)
4!+ . . .+
(
48
13
)
15! possible full routes involving Alice and
Bob, where the factorial terms account for all the possible
arrangements. For example, there are
(
48
1
)
trimmed routes of
length 1, and their corresponding full routes have length 3 (this
includes the unknown node that defines the trimmed route,
Alice and Bob), and there are 3! = 6 possible arrangements
of these three nodes. This total number of possible full routes
amounts to representing each full route on 78 bits. The binary
sequences representing the full routes corresponding to the
trimmed routes in Mk are then XORed together. The result
is inserted into a (k, 2)-randomness extractor [19] (defined
below), which outputs a shorter bit string sk – the secret. The
secret sk should satisfy the (1, 2)-security defined below. The
following series of definitions – some of them included for the
sake of completeness – formalizes this procedure.
Definition 1: Minimum Entropy: From [17]: Let X be a
random variable with alphabet X and probability distribution
of PX(x). The min-entropy is defined as
H∞(X) = −log max
x∈X
PX(x). (2)
Definition 2: Smooth Minimum Entropy: From [17]: Let
X be a random variable with alphabet X and probability
distribution of PX(x), and let 3 > 0. The 3-smooth min-
entropy of X is defined as
H3∞(X) = −log maxQX∈B3 (PX) QX(x) (3)
where the maximum ranges over the 3-ball B3(PX) [17].
Definition 3: Extractor: From [19]: A function E:
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}s is a (k, 2)-extractor if for every
distribution X over {0, 1}n, with H∞(X) ≥ k,E(X,Y ) is
2-close to uniform, where Y is distributed uniform and it
is independent of X . Here 2-close refers to the statistical
distance[19].
Randomness extractors are functions that generate almost
uniform bits (truly random bits) from weak random sources.
Note that the extractor defined above is a seeded extractor, i.e.
it requires a few additional bits of (non-secret) randomness.
Definition 4: In the context of a MANET, a piece of secret
common randomness sk established between two nodes Alice
and Bob is called (1, 2)-secure if, with probability larger than
1−1, the secret sk is 2-close to uniform from the perspective
of any node in the network, except Alice and Bob.
It has been shown in [17] that the number of completely
random bits that can be extracted from a bit sequence should be
upper bounded by, but very close to, the smooth min-entropy
of the sequence. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, we shall
only focus on the (smooth) minimum entropy of a full route,
viewed from the perspective of an eavesdropper who does
not know anything about the associated trimmed route. This
minimum entropy is a good indication of the number of secret
random bits that can be extracted from each set Mk. In the
remainder of this section we shall show how to calculate, how
to smooth out (if possible), and how to artificially increase this
minimum entropy.
Calculating this min-entropy is equivalent to computing a
probability distribution that characterizes Eve’s belief about the
unknown full route. The task is not straightforward because of
two reasons. First routes of different lengths have different
probabilities of appearing in SRTs (these depend on the
network parameters). Second, if a route is longer, then the
probability that Eve has accidentally overheard it is larger –
recall (1). Therefore, we start off with an empirically-derived
prior p(Lr = lr) denoting the probability that the unknown
route has length lr, and with p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr) =
1− p(KEve(r) = 1|Lr = lr) from (1), and we compute
p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0) =
=
p(Lr = lr)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = lr)∑
l
p(Lr = l)p(KEve(r) = 0|Lr = l) . (4)
As explained above, from Eve’s perspective there are
(
N−2
lr−2
)
lr!
equally-likely full routes of length lr and containing Alice and
Bob, where N is the total number of nodes in the MANET.
Thus we can write the probability that the unknown full route
is r (where r has the length of lr) as:
p(r|KEve(r) = 0)) = p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0)(N−2
lr−2
)
lr!
, (5)
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. OPNET Simulation and Results
The proposed protocol has been simulated in OPNET
Modeler, using the parameters indicated in table I. This choice
of parameters results in a maximum eavesdropping range of
de = 12m.
TABLE I: Simulation Parameters
Simulation Parameters Value
Network Size 100m*100m
Number of Nodes 50
Simulation Duration 600(sec)
Transmit Power(w) .005
Packet Reception-Power Threshold(dBm) -55
Speed(meters/seconds) uniform(.5,1)
Packet Inter-Arrival Time(seconds) exponential(1)
Each node sends packets to four random destinations. The
number of full routes vs the full route length is shown in
figure 4, and the empirically-derived prior p(Lr = lr) looks
similar. The posterior probability p(Lr = lr|KEve(r) = 0) is
illustrated in figure 5.
To calculate the min entropy, we need the probability
distribution of the unknown full route. According to (5), this is
p(r|KEve(r) = 0)) = p(Lr=lr|KEve(r)=0)( 48lr−2)lr! . Due to the obtained
Fig. 4: Number Of Full Routes vs. Full Route Length
Fig. 5: Posterior Probability Distribution of an Unknown Route’s Length
values being more than 20 orders of magnitude apart, we chose
to represent p(r|KEve(r) = 0)) in table II.
It can be easily seen that Hmin(r|KEve(r) = 0)) =
− log2(0.00062) = 10.66, and that smoothing out the proba-
bility distribution, with a sensibly small smoothing parameter
3 cannot increase the min entropy. In other words, about 10
bits can be extracted from each subsetMk of full routes. Now
the remaining question is how many subsetsMk we can form.
To solve this problem, for any pair of nodes we organize the
full set of all trimmed routes M as a selection matrix. In
the selection matrix, a row corresponds to one of the trimmed
routes inM. A column corresponds to a node’s address. There
are 38 columns (one for each node in the MANET, except
Alice and Bob). Each entry in the matrix is the probability
that the node in the respective column knows the full route
corresponding to the respective row. The selection matrix can
be represented as follows:

node 1 node 2 . . . node t
m1 a11 a12 . . . a1t
m2 a21 a22 . . . a2t
...
...
...
. . .
...
mh an1 an2 . . . ant

where aij is the probability that node j knows full route
i. For example, when node j is a part of the full route
corresponding to the trimmed route i, then aij = 1. Otherwise,
aij = p(Kj(i) = 1|Li = li), where lr is the length of the full
route i. Now the partitioning algorithm consists of constructing
TABLE II: Probability Distribution of an Unknown Full Route, from Eve’s Perspective
Length Of the Full Route 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
probability 0.00062 9.02E-06 9.7E-08 1.1E-09 1.1E-11 1.1E-13 1.2E-15 9.9E-18 1E-19 1E-21 1.6E-23 2E-25 2E-27
TABLE III: Number of subsets, obtained by the naı¨ve algorithm, when
considering all full routes of length at least 3. Total network-wide achievable
number of shared secret bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Btotal
No. of Pairs, 1 = 10−3 215 75 22 6 1 0 1 4.98 · 103
No. of Pairs, 1 = 10−4 192 58 7 3 1 1 0 3.75 · 103
distinct sub-matrices Mk, each consisting of hk rows of M,
such that the product of the entries in each column of Mk be
less than 1. We shall informally call this property 1-security.
An optimal partition maximizes the number of sub-matrices
Mk with the 1-security property.
For this paper, we chose to implement a naı¨ve partition
algorithm. In this algorithm, Alice buildsM1 by selecting the
first row in the selection matrix, and adding the next row in
the selection matrix, until the column-wise product condition
holds. Then Alice moves to the next row, and starts building
M2, and so on, until she runs out of columns inMk. For two
different 1, the number of subsets in the whole network is
shown in table III. To provide a basis for comparison with the
results in the next subsection, we also calculate the maximum
achievable total network-wide number of shared random bits
(between all the possible pairs in the network), Btotal – this
is shown in the last column of table III. For example, for
1 = 10
−3, we have Btotal = 10.66 · (215 · 1 + 75 · 2 + 22 ·
3 + 6 · 4 + 1 · 5 + 1 · 7).
B. Increasing The Secret’s Length by Spoiling Knowledge
Spoiling knowledge was introduced in [20] as a means
of (publicly) adjusting a probability distribution to increase
its min entropy. In our specific example, this translates to
purposely discarding the most likely full routes from the
SRT. But since all routes of the same length have the same
probability (from Eve’s perspective), we can only increase the
min entropy by discarding all the routes of a given length. The
downside, of course, is that the number of partitions satisfying
the properties outlined in Section V-A also decreases.
For our specific scenario, disregarding the full routes of
length 3 yields a min entropy of roughly Hmin(r|KEve(r) =
0)) = − log2(9.02 · 10−6) = 16.76 bits. For two different
values of 1, the number of subsets in the whole network is
shown in table IV. Again, the last column of the table shows
the maximum achievable total network-wide number of shared
random bits Btotal. It is interesting to note that for 1 = 10−3
and 1 = 10−4, the spoiling knowledge technique achieves a
gain of roughly 23% and 15%, respectively.
TABLE IV: Number of subsets, obtained by the naı¨ve algorithm, when
considering only full routes of length at least 4. Total network-wide achievable
number of shared secret bits, in last column.
No. of Subsets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Btotal
No. of Pairs, 1 = 10−3 195 60 11 2 2 0 0 6.13 · 103
No. of Pairs, 1 = 10−4 159 37 5 0 2 0 0 4.32 · 103
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have shown that the randomness inherent in an ad-
hoc network can be harvested and used for establishing
shared secret keys. For practical network parameters, we have
demonstrated that after only ten minutes of use, thousands of
shared secret bits can be established between various pairs of
nodes. This number can be further increased by the spoiling
knowledge technique of [20]. While we showed how this works
at the entire-network level, a better option might be to let each
one of the pairs of nodes decide whether using the spoiling
knowledge technique is advantageous or not.
The number of achievable shared secret bits can be further
increased by devising a more efficient partition algorithm
for the generation of full-route subsets with the 1-security
property, instead of the naı¨ve algorithm used in this paper.
Finally, although this paper focuses on the routing infor-
mation circulated by DSR, other types of randomness can be
exploited, such as the network’s connectivity or traffic load.
These untapped sources of randomness are the subject of future
work.
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